


**Top Secret**



*H12.*

## STAFF NOTES:

# Soviet Union Eastern Europe


State Department review completed

**Top Secret**

149

25X1

January 29, 1975



25X1

Approved For Release 2005/04/22 : CIA-RDP79T00865A000200310001-6

Approved For Release 2005/04/22 : CIA-RDP79T00865A000200310001-6

25X1

**SOVIET UNION - EASTERN EUROPE**

25X1

*CONTENTS*

January 29, 1975

25X1

Shelepin Visit to FRG Could Provoke Incident. . . . .	2
Prague Moderates, Hard-liners May End Dispute . . . . .	3
USSR: "Reform" in the Industrial Supply Sector . . . . .	5
Cardinal Wyszynski Resumes Offensive. . . . .	6

25X1

25X1

Approved For Release 2005/04/22 : CIA-RDP79T00865A000200310001-6

Approved For Release 2005/04/22 : CIA-RDP79T00865A000200310001-6

Shelepin Visit to FRG  
Could Provoke Incident

Soviet trade union boss and Politburo member Aleksandr Shelepin is expected to arrive in West Germany on Thursday for talks with West German trade union leaders.

The visit is part of a broader Soviet campaign to strengthen ties with individual West European trade union organizations and develop multilateral East-West trade union contacts in an effort to increase Soviet influence in labor matters. Shelepin has been in East Germany on trade union business since January 27.

Shelepin and his West German hosts are handling the visit gingerly to avoid stirring up the embers of a 1959 Bavarian criminal case. Shelepin, later head of the KGB, was implicated in the murder of Ukrainian exile leader Stepan Bandera by Soviet agents. There is no warrant for Shelepin's arrest outstanding, but any West German citizen could request one and prosecutors from individual West German states could obtain one. At the least, Shelepin's visit will probably arouse some unfavorable publicity.

The West Germans have tried to keep the visit quiet and short. West German trade union federation chairman Vetter, anticipating a negative public reaction, has declined to be Shelepin's official host.

25X1

January 29, 1975

Prague Moderates, Hard-liners May End Dispute

The US embassy in Prague reports the city is rife with rumors that imply moderates and hard-liners in Czechoslovakia's top leadership are close to resolving their prolonged, sharp differences over management of the economy.

The moderate faction, led by party boss Husak, has long recognized the need for better management of the economy. The hard-liners have insisted that ideological purity is more important than professional expertise, particularly in staffing the middle and top levels of the economic bureaucracy. During the past year, they have been able to put up a particularly stiff fight because of Moscow's demands that ideological discipline be tightened in the face of detente.

In response to the Soviet prodding, Prague undertook a "comprehensive cadres review" of the professional and ideological qualifications of its bureaucrats. Many officials lost their jobs and party memberships during the review. The regime was thus deprived of badly needed expertise--a situation worsened by the adamant refusal of the hard-liners to give jobs to persons ostracized for their activities during the "Prague Spring."

By fall, the division in the leadership had become so sharp that Husak reportedly attempted to outflank his opposition by taking his case for moderation to the lower levels of the party. In November, a Central Committee plenum adopted "cadres proposals" that still have not been published. A spate of regional party meetings devoted to "critical and frank" discussions of the plenum's decisions, have fed the rumors that changes are in the offing.

January 29, 1975

We have seen no evidence to support the rumors that the dispute has, in fact, been resolved. Indications are that Husak is very much in control and enjoys the support of some powerful leaders who agree that the country is chronically short of good managers. Some form of moderation may thus occur. Whatever changes are made will be tempered by the need to preserve the delicate balance between moderates and conservatives.

25X1

25X1

January 29, 1975

USSR: "Reform" in the  
Industrial Supply Sector

The current issue of *Ekonomicheskaya Gazeta* reports that a new system of measuring the output of enterprises in the Soviet industrial supply sector has increased the efficiency of these organizations substantially. According to an official of the State Committee for Material and Technical Supply, an experiment was conducted in which supply organizations were rewarded according to how completely they met their contracts to supply industrial customers with raw materials, semifinished goods, and other inputs. In the past, they have been judged primarily on sales volume. Industrial customers complained of late deliveries, of delivery of products that did not meet specifications, or of receiving items that were not ordered. The result was that their own output plans were jeopardized.

The change may appear to be a modest injection of common sense, but immediate, wide-scale adoption of it is unlikely. Determination of contract fulfillment must be done by hand calculation until a computerized mathematical model now under development is available.

25X1

January 29, 1975

25X1



Poland's Cardinal Wyszynski Resumes Offensive\*Summary

Cardinal Wyszynski returned from the Synod of Bishops in Rome in mid-November, apparently with greater confidence and stature. Church sources and Catholic intellectuals in Poland believe that his influence was widely felt in Rome, and some signs suggest that he is now stepping up the pressure on the Gierk regime. Symbolizing this turn of events is the recent publication by a Catholic weekly of the Pope's message to the Synod, in which the Wyszynski imprint is widely perceived in Warsaw. Thus, at year's end, the Cardinal seems to have regained some of the initiative that he may have lost as a result of the regime's more conciliatory stance and its active diplomacy with the Vatican. The basic impasse in church-state relations appears little changed, however, and the long-term outlook remains uncertain.

Episcopate Toughens Its Line

The Catholic weekly, *Tygodnik Powszechny*, published the Pope's Message on Human Rights on November 24, two days before the convening of the 145th Episcopate Conference. The Papal message had special significance for the Polish reader, particularly its observation that religious freedom today is either "being refused or limited under various political systems which are hindering the practice of religion, religious education, and social work." These sentiments and the Pope's admonition against reducing believers to the status of "second-class citizens" are echoed in the language of the communique issued following the conference.

*\*This item is an extensive excerpt from an Airgram prepared by US Embassy Warsaw.*

January 29, 1975

The communique also takes strong positions on issues heretofore treated only in veiled terms. It stipulates that normalization of relations between the government of Poland and the Vatican must have substance, not merely "institutional-administrative form," and can become "full and lasting" only if preceded by normalized church-state ties at home. The communique further emphasizes that, although Polish bishops work in close concert with the Vatican, they are led by their Primate, and have "direct responsibility" for the Church in Poland.

Despite these signs of the Church's stiffening attitude, it is unlikely to burn its bridges to the regime. The Cardinal has long sought a meeting with Premier Jaroszewicz, and according to current rumors the encounter may be near at hand. The Cardinal is also clearly anxious to safeguard his line of communication to the Vatican. He recently told a US official that the Vatican would be in full agreement with him if it better comprehended the realities of the Church's plight in Poland. He probably hopes to indoctrinate Archbishop Poggi along these lines during the latter's talks with government officials in Warsaw next month.

### Outlook

The future is in many respects beyond Wyszynski's power to influence. He remains skeptical that detente will produce the fundamental changes in the regime that he insists the Church requires. The regime probably feels it can afford to go slowly and continue maneuvering to undermine the Cardinal's position. The regime may also take a long view of such issues as filling vacant bishoprics, believing that if it can effect appointment of bishops amenable to its viewpoint, then it could significantly influence the appointment of an eventual successor to the Cardinal himself.

January 29, 1975

[REDACTED]

The Episcopate also claims a basis for hope in the future. Church officials express confidence in their ability to maintain a position founded on the continuing support of most Catholics who still comprise the "overwhelming majority of Poles."

Given such conditions, the Church is unlikely either to collapse under regime pressures or to make inroads against the regime, particularly in the face of the latter's increasingly sophisticated approach. Consequently, little basic change in church-state relations is expected because each side will skirt the fundamental questions dividing them.

The bottleneck is that each side wants the genuine and sincere recognition that the other is unwilling to grant. Minister Kakol recently told a foreign correspondent that the regime seeks "recognition" from the Church, but he frankly said that the regime is willing to concede "nothing" in return. For his part, the Cardinal still publicly withholds even token recognition of state authority by employing circumlocutions such as "those who rule us." Thus barring major change, such as an unlikely Vatican cave-in to Warsaw diplomacy or an equally unlikely capitulation by the regime to Church demands, there seems little basis for expecting significant change other than ups and downs in the atmospherics.


[REDACTED]

January 29, 1975

25X1

Approved For Release 2005/04/22 : CIA-RDP79T00865A000200310001-6

**Top Secret**



**Top Secret**

Approved For Release 2005/04/22 : CIA-RDP79T00865A000200310001-6